SUPREME COURT NO. 91555-5
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 44019-9-II

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GUY WUTHRICH,

Petitioner,

v.

KING COUNTY AND CHRISTA GILLAND,

Respondents.

RESPONDENT KING COUNTY'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
King County Prosecuting Attorney

CINDI S. PORT
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent King County

King County Prosecuting Attorney
900 King County Administration Building
500 Fourth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98104
(206) 296-8820

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I. IDENTITY OF RESPONDENT

Respondent King County asks the Court to deny review of the Court of Appeals' decision identified in part II, below.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

In this unpublished decision, *Guy H. Wuthrich v. King County and Christa Gilland (Price),* No. 44019-9-II (March 10, 2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed longstanding precedent stating that in roadway cases, an inherently dangerous condition is one that exists in the roadway itself, and that a roadway reasonably safe for public travel does not become inherently dangerous simply because a municipality fails to remove off-road vegetation that tends to obstruct the view. *Slip Op.* at 7. The Court also ruled that a municipality's general duty to build and maintain roads in a reasonably safe manner for ordinary travel does not require it to constantly re-design roads and change signage to accommodate possible sight limitations caused by seasonal shrub growth located off the roadway. *Slip Op.* at 8-12. Neither of these non-precedential rulings conflict with any decision of this Court or the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, there are multiple other grounds to affirm the trial court's summary judgment ruling. This Court should therefore deny review of the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion in this case.

III. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

A. This Court has ruled that in roadway cases, an inherently dangerous condition is one that exists in the roadway itself, and a roadway reasonably safe for public travel does not become inherently dangerous simply because a municipality does not remove off-road vegetation that tends to obstruct the view. Based on this rule, the Court of Appeals rejected Wuthrich's claim that King County's failure to maintain off-road brush growth at an intersection caused sight limitations that created an inherently dangerous condition. Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with Washington law?

B. In addition to eliminating inherently dangerous conditions, municipalities have a broad duty to maintain roadways in a condition reasonably safe for ordinary travel based on the totality of the circumstances. But no Washington decision has ever held that this duty requires municipalities to remove off-road bush growth or continually adjust signs and road markings in response to possible vision obstructions caused by seasonal bush growth. Does the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision refusing to recognize this expansion of municipal duty conflict with Washington law?

C. A party seeking to modify a ruling by the Court of Appeals

Commissioner or Clerk must file a motion to modify the ruling with the judges of the court, and in the absence of a timely motion to modify, the ruling stands. RAP 17.7. In this case, Wuthrich filed a motion for discretionary review of a trial court decision denying his motion for partial summary judgment, which had sought a determination that property owners have a duty to eliminate unsafe conditions on land abutting a street. The Commissioner denied discretionary review, Wuthrich never moved to modify this ruling, and the Court of Appeals determined that Wuthrich had abandoned this argument. Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with Washington law?

IV. SUMMARY

The intersection involved in this case is located at Avondale Road and N.E. 159th Street in Woodinville, Washington. On June 20, 2008, off-duty Kirkland Police Officer Christa Gilland stopped at an unknown location at the intersection. She looked left and then right, and continued to look right for several seconds while cars passed. She then pulled into the intersection without looking left again. Due to her failure to yield the right of way, Officer Gilland collided with plaintiff, Guy Wuthrich, who was approaching on Avondale from her left.

Wuthrich alleges that the intersection was not reasonably safe for ordinary travel because overgrown blackberry bushes "might have"

obstructed Gilland's view to her left. This is incorrect. The actual sight line available to Gilland near the time of the accident is depicted below in Figure 1. This shows that Gilland had an unobstructed view to the left that allowed her to see all the way down Avondale prior to pulling into the intersection. Therefore, Wuthrich cannot demonstrate that King County breached its duty of care or that the sightline at the intersection was a cause of this accident.



Figure 1

Wuthrich nonetheless asks the Court to impose a broad duty on municipalities to maintain off-road bush growth that could possibly interfere with roadway sight distances. This Court has directly held, however, that no such duty exists. Wuthrich also claims that to comply with the duty to maintain roadways in a condition safe for ordinary travel, municipalities must continually alter signage and road markings anywhere

that seasonal shrub growth might obscure sight distances. No court has ever imposed such a sweeping obligation in this state. The Court should deny review of the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision because it does not conflict with any decision of this Court or the Court of Appeals.

If the Court grants review, it should affirm the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Alternatively, the Court should affirm because (1) King County met its duty to provide a roadway reasonably safe for ordinary travel, and (2) the County's actions did not cause Wuthrich's injury.

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. KING COUNTY RE-DESIGNS THE INTERSECTION TO MAKE IT SAFER.

The accident in this case occurred on June 20, 2008 at the intersection of Avondale Road and N.E. 159th Street. Over three years before that, in 2005, King County re-designed this intersection due to a high number of rear end collisions on Avondale. CP 177-191. This redesign, completed in May 2005, improved safety at the intersection. *Id.*

There are blackberry bushes and a power pole at the northwest corner of Avondale and 159th Street. The bushes and pole do not obstruct the vision of motorists from a distance of ten feet behind the edge of the traveled way, as indicated in Figure 1, above. CP 222-34. This sightline complies with King County's road standards (CP 177-191), and it

provided Officer Gilland with over 730 feet of unobstructed visibility, measured 10 feet back from the edge of the traveled way (i.e., the fog line). CP 177-191, 301. Although King County is not required to follow other road design manuals, the sightline nevertheless complied with both state and federal road design manuals. CP 303, 703-707.

Between the 2005 re-design and June 20, 2008 accident, there was one other, dissimilar accident out of the estimated 15 to 20 million cars using the intersection. CP 192-222. King County relied on this as evidence that the intersection was reasonably safe for ordinary travel and did not contain an inherently dangerous condition. Furthermore, Wuthrich's road design expert, Mr. Stevens, found no evidence that King County received any notice of an inherently dangerous or misleading condition at the intersection during this period. CP 298.

B. GILLAND HAD A CLEAR VIEW DOWN AVONDALE BEFORE PULLING INTO THE INTERSECTION AND COULD ONLY SPECULATE THAT THE BUSHES OBSTRUCTED HER VIEW.

Defendant Christa Gilland is a Kirkland police officer who was off duty when the accident occurred. CP 243, CP 250. She lives a little less than a mile from the accident intersection and drove through it every day. CP 248. Her divorce had recently become final and, on the day of the accident, she changed her name back to her maiden name on her driver's

license. CP 249 and 254. She then went out to lunch with friends, drove home, went for a run, showered and then left to pick up her children from the babysitter. CP 249. As she drove eastbound on 159th, she was changing a "favorite" setting on her cell phone. CP 253. She still had her cell phone in her right hand when she came to the intersection. *Id.*

Although Officer Gilland initially indicated that she stopped at the "stop line" (CP 432), her later testimony reflects that she does not know where she actually stopped at the intersection just before the accident. CP 256. She does not know how far down Avondale she could see when she stopped. CP 258. And she has no idea whether the bushes or pole actually blocked her view of oncoming traffic or even played any role in the accident. CP 261-62. Gilland's attorney described her testimony on these critical issues as "guestimates." CP 710.

Gilland testified, however, that she had a "clear view down Avondale to [her] left" and that she "stopped at a point where [she] believed [she] could see far enough down the roadway and the roadway was clear." CP 250-51. This is consistent with what she told an investigating officer eleven days after the accident: "Christa stated that she looked left and that it was 'wide open' so she looked right and then went. She does not think she looked left again . . .". CP 275.

Nearly three years after the accident, in March 2011, Gilland prepared a declaration at the request of plaintiff's counsel. CP 261-62. Gilland provided this statement after Wuthrich promised not to go after her personal assets. CP 726. In this declaration, Gilland stated that the blackberry bushes and power pole "might have" obstructed her view. CP 277-78. Gilland later conceded that she was only speculating or guessing in saying this. CP 261-62.

C. PLAINTIFF'S EXPERTS CANNOT SAY THAT THE BUSHES OR THE POLE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS ACCIDENT.

Plaintiff's accident reconstructionist, Mr. Olson, admits that he cannot provide an opinion that the bushes or pole actually played any role in this accident. CP 998. He does not know where Officer Gilland stopped. CP 994. He has no opinion where Wuthrich was on the road when Gilland looked left. CP 992. He has no opinion where Wuthrich was on the road when Gilland initiated her turn. CP 1000. And he has no opinion whether the bushes or pole actually obstructed Gilland's view of Wuthrich. CP 1000.

Olson agreed that this accident could have occurred because Gilland simply failed to see Wuthrich on the roadway when she initially looked left, and because Gilland failed to look to the left again before pulling into the intersection. CP 265, 285. Gilland agreed that her failure to look left again prior to initiating her start was the cause of this accident. CP 265.

Plaintiff's road design expert, Mr. Stevens, evaluated the intersection without considering any details of what occurred in the accident. CP 299-300. Stevens did not rely on anything Gilland had to say in conducting his analysis. CP 306. He has never claimed that the supposed condition caused this accident or affected Officer Gilland's driving in any manner. CP 1265, 1331-1335. More specifically, Mr. Stevens has never provided an opinion that Officer Gilland's view of plaintiff was obstructed on June 20, 2008 (CP 305), or that his suggested alternative sightline, which is not found in any known design manual, would have prevented this accident.

D. THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED WUTHRICH'S CLAIMS AGAINST KING COUNTY, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED.

Based on this evidence, the trial court granted King County's motion for summary judgment, ruling that King County did not breach its duty of care and was not a proximate cause of this accident. The trial court then entered final judgment as to King County, stayed the trial against co-defendant Officer Gilland, and issued CR 56(d) findings.

Wuthrich appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals, Division II. On March 10, 2015, the Court of Appeals issued its unpublished decision affirming the trial court, finding "no genuine issue of any material fact regarding the County's breach of its duty to exercise ordinary

care to build and maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe manner for ordinary travel." *Slip Op.*, at 1. Wuthrich then filed a petition for review.

VI. ARGUMENT

A. A MUNICIPALITY'S DUTY TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN ROADS IN A REASONABLY SAFE MANNER DOES NOT REQUIRE IT TO REMOVE OFF-ROAD BUSHES OR ADJUST ROAD SIGNS AND MARKINGS TO ACCOMMODATE SEASONAL BRUSH GROWTH.

A municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to build and maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe manner for the forseeable acts of those using the roadways. *Keller v. City of Spokane*, 146 Wn.2d 237, 252, 44 P.3d 845 (2002). This general duty to provide reasonably safe roadways also includes a specific obligation to eliminate inherently dangerous or misleading conditions. *Owen v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co.*, 153 Wn.2d 780, 788, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). The duty to eliminate inherently dangerous conditions is only a specific aspect of a municipality's general duty of care, however, and a plaintiff may show that a municipality has breached its duty without showing a failure to eliminate an inherently dangerous condition. *Slip Op.*, at 7, *citing Chen v. City of Seattle,* 153 Wn. App. 890, 900, 223 P.3d 1230 (2009), *rev. denied*, 169 Wn.2d 1003(2010).

The Court of Appeals framed the issue in this case as whether King County breached a duty to Wuthrich "to either (1) eliminate inherently dangerous conditions on the roadways or (2) exercise ordinary care to build

and maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe manner for ordinary travel." *Slip Op.* at 5-6.[1] The court correctly determined that King County is not liable to Wuthrich under either theory.

1. Off-Road Brush does not constitute an inherently unsafe condition.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the brush line at the intersection did not create an inherently dangerous condition because such conditions must exist in the roadway itself. *Slip Op.* at 7. This ruling followed longstanding precedent of this Court. *See Barton v. King County*, 18 Wn.2d 573, 576-77, 139 P.2d 1019 (1943) (unusual danger noticed by the books is a danger in the highway itself; natural vegetation that obscures the view does not render roadway inherently dangerous); *Bradshaw v. City of Seattle*, 43 Wn.2d 766, 774, 264 P.2d 265 (1953) (where street is reasonably safe for public travel it is not rendered inherently dangerous solely because a municipality fails to cut down natural vegetation which tends to obstruct the view at an intersection); *Rathbun v. Stevens County*, 46 Wn.2d 352, 356, 281 P.2d 853 (1955) ("where a road itself is reasonably safe for public travel, it is not rendered inherently dangerous to travelers exercising reasonable care, solely because a municipality fails to remove vegetation located off of the road,

[1] The Court properly reviewed this case de novo and did not address the reasons for the trial court's decisions. *Slip Op.* at 6. Although Wuthrich discusses the trial court's reasoning at some length in his petition (*see* Petition for Review at 6-8), King County will not respond to these arguments as the trial court's reasoning is irrelevant at this point in the case.

which tends to obstruct the view."). Because the Court of Appeals' ruling on this issue is consistent with Washington law, there is no basis for review.

2. A roadway does not become unsafe for ordinary travel simply because seasonal off-road brush growth obstructs the view.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that, under the general duty of reasonable care, a municipality is not required to adjust speed limits or change road markings to accommodate view restrictions caused by off-road brush growth. *Slip Op.* at 9, 12. The court declined to impose such a duty in this case because the brush line was not part of the roadway itself. *Id.* at 10, 12. This ruling does not conflict with any decision of this Court or the Court of Appeals.

Wuthrich cites a series of Washington cases that he claims imposed duties on municipalities to remedy off-road conditions as part of their duty of care. *See* Petition for Review, at 8-11; 17-19. None of these decisions, however, involved allegations of view obstructions caused by seasonal, off-road vegetation.[2]

This Court has repeatedly made clear – even after adopting the

[2] *Raybell v. State,* 6 Wn. App. 795, 796, 496 P.2d 559 (1972) (inadequate guardrails); *Breivo v. City of Aberdeen*, 15 Wn. App. 520, 550 P.2d 1164 (1976) (solid immovable barrier erected by City 13 inches from roadway); *Lowman v. Wilbur*, 178 Wn.2d 165, 309 P.3d 387 (2013) (utility pole 4.47 feet from road edge); *Chen v. City of Seattle*, 153 Wn. App. 890, 223 P.3d 1230 (2009) (crosswalk).

modern formulation of duty announced in *Bergland v. Spokane County*[3] – that a muncipality's duty to maintain roadways in a reasonably safe manner does not require it to remove roadside vegetation or re-design roadways to accommodate off-road vegetation. *Barton,* 18 Wn.2d at 576-78 (expressly declining to apply reasoning of *Berglund* to off-road vegetation); *Bradshaw v. City of Seattle*, 43 Wn.2d 766, 775, 264 P.2d 265 (1953); *Rathbun*, 46 Wn.2d at 356. Sound policy supports this result. Requiring municipalities to constantly monitor the ebb and flow of seasonal vegetation and redesign intersections to accommodate such growth would confuse the traveling public and place an imponderable burden on government entities. *See Barton*, 18 Wn.2d 573, 576. The Court of Appeals' decision accurately states the law and does not conflict with decisions of this Court or other decisions of the Court of Appeals.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REFUSED TO DECIDE THE DUTY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO MAINTAIN BUSHES BECAUSE WUTHRICH FAILED TO MOVE TO MODIFY THE COMMISSIONER'S RULING DENYING REVIEW OF THAT ISSUE.

Wuthrich claims that the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with Washington cases that impose a duty on private property owners to maintain their land so that adjacent public roads are not rendered unsafe for ordinary

[3] 4 Wn.2d 309, 315, 103 P.2d 355 (1940) ("determination of whether or not a municipality has exercised reasonable care in the performance of its duty to maintain its public ways in a reasonably safe condition must in each case necessarily depend upon the surrounding circumstances.").

travel. Petition for Review, at 11- 17. He is mistaken. The Court of Appeals never decided this issue because Wuthrich failed to preserve it for review. *See Slip Op.* at 8, note 7.

At the trial court, Wuthrich filed four motions for partial summary judgment, two of which are relevant here. First, Wuthrich sought a ruling that King County was the owner of the private property where the vegetation was located. This motion was continued and later dismissed as moot. Second, Wuthrich sought a ruling that King County had a duty to maintain the property adjacent to the road so the road would be safe for ordinary travel.[4] The trial court denied this motion and then denied Wuthrich's motion for reconsideration. *Id.*

Wuthrich included this second order denying partial summary judgment in his notice of appeal from the trial court's dismissal of King County from this case. *Id.* But the trial court did not make CR 54(b) findings regarding this order or certify it for review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). The Court of Appeals determined the order was not appealable as a matter of right, converted the notice of appeal to a notice of discretionary review, and directed Wuthrich to file a motion for discretionary review. Ruling Denying Review, at 2.

Wuthrich filed a motion for discretionary review, and the Court of

[4] *See* Ruling Denying Review, at 2 (attached to Petition for Review as Appendix E).

Appeals commissioner denied the motion. The commissioner ruled that the trial court's denial of partial summary judgment did not amount to obvious error under RAP 2.3(b)(1). Ruling Denying Review, at 4.

Wuthrich complains that because of the commissioner's ruling, he was "required to drop the issue of a landowner's duty from his appeal." Petition for Review, at 13. This is false. Under RAP 17.7, a person may object to a commissioner's ruling, but "only by a motion to modify the ruling directed to the judges of the court served by the commissioner or clerk." If a timely motion to modify is made, it is heard and decided by the judges. But in the absence of a motion to modify, the ruling stands.[5]

Wuthrich had every opportunity to present the denial of his motion for partial summary judgment to the panel of the Court of Appeals in this case. He elected not to do so. Thus, the commissioner's ruling declining review of this issue is final, and the Court of Appeals properly refused to consider it. This Court should do the same and disregard Wuthrich's arguments at pages 11 to 17 of his Petition.

C. IF REVIEW IS GRANTED, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE KING COUNTY DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE A REASONABLY SAFE ROADWAY AND ITS ACTIONS WERE NOT THE LEGAL CAUSE OR CAUSE IN FACT OF WUTHRICH'S INJURIES.

[5] *See* 3 K. Tegland, Wash. Practice, *Rules Practice*, RAP 17.7, p. 445 (7th Ed. 2011).

Should the Court grant review in this case, King County asks it to affirm the Court of Appeals' decision because it accurately reflects Washington law. King County also asks the Court, pursuant to RAP 13.4(d), to affirm for two alternative reasons briefed below but not relied on by the Court of Appeals: (1) King County met its duty of care to provide a reasonably safe roadway, and (2) King County's actions or inactions did not cause this accident.

1. King County met its duty of care.

King County met its duty to provide a roadway reasonably safe for ordinary travel in this case as a matter of law. King County followed all binding statutes, ordinances and regulations regarding the design and maintenance of the intersection. County Road Design Standards require an entering sight line of 685 feet of visibility, measured 10 feet back from the edge of the traveled way, regardless of the placement a stop bar. CP 177-191. The County exceeded this standard by providing over 730 feet of unobstructed visibility, measured ten feet back from the edge of the traveled way. *Id.* As shown in Figure 1, above, this sightline – which was available to Officer Gilland on the day of the accident – is completely unobstructed by the power pole and bushes. CP 222-234.

Following King County's re-design of the intersection in 2005, the intersection proved remarkably safe. Only one dissimilar accident occurred

in this intersection between the 2005 re-design and Wuthrich's accident, although some 15 to 20 million cars passed through the intersection. CP 192-221. The County had no notice that the intersection was not safe, and plaintiff's expert, Mr. Stevens, concedes that the County received no notice of an inherently dangerous condition. CP 298.

2. King County's actions did not cause Wuthrich's injury.

Additionally, Wuthrich has failed to show as a matter of law that King County's actions or omissions were the cause his injuries. Even if he could show breach of duty, he has failed to produce sufficient evidence on proximate cause. *Pratt v. Thomas,* 80 Wn.2d 117, 119, 491 P.2d 1285 (1971).

Logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent dictate that King County should not be the legal cause of this accident. Drivers may often encounter intersections where their view could be partially obscured by a dangling branch or seasonal shrubbery. The law requires them to stop at a stop sign or stop bar, *and move ahead and then stop again*, regardless of how many times it takes, to confirm the roadway is clear of on-coming motorists before proceeding into an intersection.[6] This is the "clear stretch of road doctrine". *See Sanders v. Crimmins,* 63 Wn.2d 702, 706, 388 P.2d 913 (1964).

[6] RCW 46.61.190(2); CP 243, 247, 258, 281 and 283.

From a distance of ten feet behind the traveled road in this case, all drivers, including Gilland, had 730 feet of unobstructed visibility to their left. It was not forseeable by King County that drivers would not avail themselves of this unobstructed sight line.

King County should not be deemed the legal cause of plaintiff's injuries when it had no control over Officer Gilland's possible failure to pull forward to view traffic or her absolute failure to look left again to make sure the intersection was clear before entering, after waiting several seconds for cars to pass from her right.[7] *See e.g. Klein v. City of Seattle,* 41 Wn. App. 636, 705 P.2d 806 (1985).

Moreover, Wuthrich cannot show that King County was a cause in fact of his injuries. A plaintiff's showing of cause in fact must be based on more than mere conjecture or speculation. *Ruff v. King County,* 125 Wn.2d 697, 707, 887 P.2d 886 (1995). "The cause of an accident may be said to be speculative when, from a consideration of all the facts, it is as likely that it happened from one cause as another." *Moore v. Hagge,* 158 Wn. App 137, 148, 241 P.3d 787 (2010).

Officer Gilland confirms that she does not know where she stopped, she does not know how far down Avondale she could see when she did stop, and she does not know if the bushes or pole obstructed her

[7] CP 260-61. No witness can testify where Officer Gilland stopped. Therefore, it is unknown if she availed herself of the unobstructed sightline.

view. CP 251, 256, 258, 261-62. Wuthrich's accident reconstructionist, Mr. Olson, could not opine that the bushes or pole obstructed Officer Gilland's view of plaintiff, or where plaintiff was on the road when Officer Gilland looked left, or where he was when she initiated her turn. CP 992, 994, 998 and 1000. Mr. Olson agreed there are two other possible causes of the accident that had nothing to do with King County: human error in detecting plaintiff on the roadway, and Officer Gilland's failure to look left again before initiating her turn. CP 285.

Wuthrich's other expert, Mr. Stevens, also gave no opinion that the bushes or pole obstructed Officer Gilland's view, that the intersection was inherently dangerous to Officer Gilland on June 20, 2008, or that his suggested sightline, which cannot be found in any known design manual, would have prevented this accident.[8]

Given these evidentiary infirmities, Wuthrich cannot show that King County was a cause in fact of his injuries. A jury should not be allowed to speculate how this accident happened.[9] Wuthrich cannot demonstrate legal or factual causation in this case as a matter of law.

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[8] *See Ruff,* 125 Wn.2d at 706-707 (court refuses to speculate that lack of guardrail was negligence where expert could not say that guardrail would have prevented injury).

[9] *See e.g. Gardner v. Seymour,* 27 Wn.2d 802, 809, 180 P.2d 564 (1947) (holding a jury will not be permitted to conjecture how the accident happened if there is nothing more than two or more conjectural theories under one or more of which a defendant would be liable).

VII. CONCLUSION

King County asks the Court to deny Wuthrich's Petition for Review because the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court or the Court of Appeals. Should the Court grant review, however, King County asks the Court, pursuant to its de novo review and under RAP 13.4(d), to affirm on two additional grounds King County raised at the Court of Appeals: King County did not breach its duty of care in this case, and Wuthrich cannot demonstrate that King County's acts were the proximate cause of his injuries.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of May, 2015.

DANIEL T. SATTERBERG
Prosecuting Attorney

By: _____
CINDI S. PORT, WSBA #25191
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent King County
Cindi.port@kingcounty.gov
WSBA Office #91002
paoappellateunitmail@kingcounty.gov

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

On the 7th day of May, 2015, I filed the foregoing via email to supreme@courts.wa.gov and served the same via email per an e-service agreement as follows:

Keith L. Kessler, WSBA #4720 — *Email only*
keith@stritmatter.com
Ray W. Kahler, WSBA #26171
ray@stritmatter.com
Garth L. Jones, WSBA #14795
garth@stritmatter.com
Bradley J. Moore, WSBA #21802
brad@stritmatter.com
Stritmatter Kessler Whelan Coluccio

David C. Nordeen, WSBA #7716 — *Email only*
Law Office of David Nordeen PLLC
dn@lawofficeofdavidnordeenpllc.com

Richard W. Lockner, WSBA #19664 — *Email & via U.S. Mail*
Krilich, La Porte, West & Lockner, P.S.
lockner@524law.com

I further certify that a copy of the same was served by hand-delivering to ABC-Legal Messengers, Inc. to be served on the Court of Appeals, Division II.

I certify under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

Lucia Tam 5-7-15

Lucia Tam, Legal Secretary — Date
Done in Seattle, Washington

OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK

To: Tam, Lucia
Cc: 'ray@stritmatter.com'; 'garth@stritmatter.com'; 'brad@stritmatter.com'; 'lockner@524law.com'; 'keith@stritmatter.com'; 'jamiek@stritmatter.com'; 'kerrym@stritmatter.com'; 'pattis@stritmatter.com'; 'dn@lawofficeofdavidnordeenpllc.com'; 'heather@lawofficeofdavidnordeenpllc.com'; 'beth@524law.com'; Port, Cindi; Travis, Liah
Subject: RE: Supreme Court No. 91555-5 - Guy H. Wuthrich v. King County (COA Division II No. 44019-9-II)

Received 5-7-15

From: Tam, Lucia [mailto:Lucia.Tam@kingcounty.gov]
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2015 1:54 PM
To: OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK
Cc: 'ray@stritmatter.com'; 'garth@stritmatter.com'; 'brad@stritmatter.com'; 'lockner@524law.com'; 'keith@stritmatter.com'; 'jamiek@stritmatter.com'; 'kerrym@stritmatter.com'; 'pattis@stritmatter.com'; 'dn@lawofficeofdavidnordeenpllc.com'; 'heather@lawofficeofdavidnordeenpllc.com'; 'beth@524law.com'; Port, Cindi; Travis, Liah
Subject: Supreme Court No. 91555-5 - Guy H. Wuthrich v. King County (COA Division II No. 44019-9-II)

Good afternoon Clerk of the Court,

Attached for filing is the "Respondent King County's Answer to Petition for Review" with Certificate of Filing and Service. Thank you.

Case name: **Guy H. Wuthrich v. King County**
Case number: **Supreme Court No. 91555-5, Court of Appeals No. 44019-9-II**
Name, phone no. and email address of the person filing the document: **Cindi S. Port, (206) 296-8820, cindi.port@kingcounty.gov**

Lucia Tam | Legal Secretary-Employment Section
Office of King County Prosecuting Attorney
500 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900 | Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: (206) 477-9564 | **Fax**: (206) 205-0447
E-mail: lucia.tam@kingcounty.gov